The controversy over warrants issued by the Chief Justice for certain part-heard criminal trials to continue during the legal vacation must be addressed as a matter of law. Political suspicion, however, strongly expressed, is not a substitute for legal analysis.
There is no doubt that the law recognises ‘legal vacation’. Order 79 rule 5 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) fixes the long vacation from 1st August to 30th September each calendar year. Howbeit, the said provision is expressly made “subject to rule 1(1).” Rule 1(1) empowers the Chief Justice to appoint any day, including a day within the vacation, for the hearing of causes or matters where circumstances require. Legal vacation, therefore, does not mean that the courts lose jurisdiction or must shut down entirely.
The position is even clearer in criminal procedure. The Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) as amended which governs criminal procedure has no provision identical to Order 79 rule 4 of C.I. 47 on legal vacation. Instead, section 169(2) of Act 30 provides that an adjournment in summary criminal proceedings shall not exceed thirty clear days and where the accused has been committed to prison, a maximum is fourteen clear days. Section 186 extends that rule to preliminary proceedings and section 170 makes provision for non-appearance of parties after adjournment. Although section 169 does not govern every conceivable mode of criminal trial, it reveals a clear statutory policy against prolonged adjournments in criminal trials.
In fact, this policy of promptness in criminal trials are direct derivatives of the entrenched constitutional mandate under article 19(1) of the 1992 Constitution that an accused be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.
That policy did not begin with the present Chief Justice. Former Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo issued the Practice Directions on Time Management, Adjournments and Adoption of Proceedings in Part-Heard Trials in Courts, 2024. These directives apply to civil and criminal trials in the District, Circuit and High Courts and are to be read together with sections 169, 186 and 263 of Act 30. They require adjournments to be granted only where extremely necessary, direct judges to proceed with scheduled trials and prohibit adjournments sine die, save in exceptional circumstances.
Earlier, Chief Justice Sophia Akuffo’s Practice Direction on Effective Case Completion Planning Strategies, 2019 required trial periods to be fixed in advance, contemplated day-to-day hearings and directed that delays and unnecessary adjournments should not be entertained. The judicial policy of expeditious criminal trials therefore predates the present circumstances.
The use of vacation warrants is also not new. In Republic v High Court (Commercial Division), Accra; Ex parte Appenteng [2010] SCGLR 327, the Supreme Court considered proceedings conducted by a Judge acting under a warrant from the Chief Justice during the legal vacation. The practice was again discussed in Ebusuapanyin Kobina Siripa v Esi Impraim & Others (Civil Appeal No. J4/02/2022) delivered on November 15, 2022. These authorities show that vacation warrants are neither a novelty nor a device invented for the present cases.
The power is, however, not absolute. Article 296 of the Constitution requires discretionary power to be exercised fairly, candidly and without arbitrariness or bias. Article 19 equally protects the accused person’s right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time, adequate preparation and representation by counsel of choice.
The proper inquiry is therefore whether the warrants were lawfully issued, applied even-handedly and implemented without prejudice to the accused person. If those conditions are satisfied, political disagreement cannot invalidate a lawful judicial act. If they are not, the remedy lies in the law.
Law must be kept distinct from politics. When every judicial act is viewed through the lens of political interest, principle yields to suspicion, and society is diminished.
